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Abstract: 
  
Since the 1990s if not earlier, the asymmetry in the European Community/European Union 
between market-making free trade rules and distributive mechanisms sometimes known as 
‘the social’ has been perceived by many as at least a potential factor contributing to a 
legitimacy crisis in European integration. There are no easy solutions to this state of affairs, 
but the European Union can take small steps toward an enhanced equilibrium. A small but 
potentially important step was taken in the Lisbon version of the Treaty on European Union, 
when the notion of a ‘social market economy’ was explicitly embraced. But what do these 
alluring words mean? They are left formally undefined and they have been freed, we submit, 
from their historical and conceptual moorings. It is up to European practice and scholarship 
to determine whether and how the idea will take on a life of its own in its new context. In this 
paper we consider a narrow but not insignificant policy field that suggests itself as a possible 
example of Europe’s social market economy principle in action, namely, the use of state aid 
rules to encourage Member States to support the hiring and accommodation of persons with 
disabilities. In exploring the legal norms and policy in this area, we put forward some 
tentative suggestions about how the idea of a social  market economy for Europe might be 
framed as the EU passes through the next phase of the integration project. 
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1. Introduction 
  
A fundamental part of the original and enduring mission of European Union is to focus on 
preventing obstacles to competition and to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal 
market. As a consequence of decades of negative integration and certain positive initiatives 
such as the Treaty-based monetary union (beleaguered of late, to be sure), European 
economic integration has progressively reduced the relative capacity of the Member States to 
influence the course of their own economy and to reach self-defined policy goals, even if the 
constraints placed on purely autonomous state action are seen as part of the price for a 
generally positive process of system-building, institutional coordination, mutual support and 
so on. 
  
With reduced policy space at the national level, which may be exacerbated in times of painful 
economic adjustment, we suggest that it is increasingly incumbent on the EU to pursue its 
various objectives and tasks in a manner that is consistent with, and supports the aims of, 
adequate social protection and correction of market failures. The imperatives of a ‘highly 
competitive social market economy’, now explicitly incorporated in the Treaty on European 
Union,[1] require the EU to play a more active role in pursuing goals of social equity in 
tandem with its other tasks. The fact that the meaning of the words ‘social market economy’ 
is contested,[2]sometimes misunderstood,[3] and laden with specific historical 
associations[4] does not mean that its development at a new, supranational level is either 
foreclosed or predestined. 
  
In what appears to be a lapse of drafting, the Lisbon Treaty only introduced a single reference 
to the idea of a social market economy. Nevertheless, this reference should be seen in light of 
a general trend toward a more serious commitment on the part of the EU to becoming more 
socially oriented. Some might find it hard to believe that such a trend has taken hold at EU 
level, such as those feeling the squeeze of austerity programmes in Member States with 
unsustainable public debt. But while slow reaction and ambivalence often dilute the 
effectiveness of its initiatives, the EU is responding, in some measure and with all its 
idiosyncrasies, to the sovereign debt crisis. In particular, it has set up temporary support 
mechanisms for the Member States, to be replaced by a permanent ‘European Stability 
Mechanism’ (ESM) in 2013, that is, if an amendment to Article 136 TFEU is approved. 
Second, the EU, and more specifically, the Commission, has taken significant steps to ratify, 
as it were, aid measures adopted by Member States to address the crisis afflicting the real 
economy.[5] The number of cases where aid was legally granted grew from 202 in 2003 to 
636 in 2007 and to 964 in 2009.[6] Moreover, in the throes of the crisis the Member States 
provided substantial support for the financial sector, with 300 billion euros in capital 
injections and almost 3 trillion euros’ worth of guarantees.[7] If we look at the so-called 
‘Europe 2020’ areas[8] (ie, research and development and innovation, environmental 
protection, regional development, broadband, SMEs, employment and training), we observe 
that, between 2004 and 2010, the Commission approved several aid measures (eg, with 
respect to R&D&I measures, 413 measures were approved as compatible, an additional 12 
measures were declared not to contain state aid and only one measure was subject to a 
negative decision with recovery).[9] We do not intend to discuss here the handling of the 
crisis, or the controversies surrounding it. But we note the heightened activity in the field of 
State aid as a contextual feature and propose to examine a more specific policy development 
that we hope can shed some light on what the notion of a social market economy might mean 
for the European Union. 
  
In this article we suggest that the development of EU rules on state aid targeted to promote 
the active inclusion in the labour market of persons with disabilities, ie, one of the most 
vulnerable groups in society, provides some basis for assessing the EU’s early steps toward 
establishing a European social market economy. Our investigation also provides us with an 
initial glimpse of how the latter concept might come to be understood. Of course, 
we recognise that the ‘social market economy’ may be interpreted in ways quite different 
from the suggestions we make here. It might even lie dormant well into the future. But we 
think it better to grapple with the idea than to let it be, since it seems to reflect an affirmative 
choice with regard to the EU’s aspirations and constitutional identity. 
  
The remainder of this discussion is divided into six sections. Section 2 reviews the meaning 
and the main features of the traditional concept of the social market economy, and then 
considers how the social market economy has emerged in the EU legal context. Section 3 
provides a general overview on the Treaty rules on state aid and how they relate to the social 
market economy, taking into account that, in the last couple of decades, they have assumed 
increasing importance and impact on national economic policies. We then analyse the EU’s 
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), as well as other guidance documents and 
Commission decisions in the field of state aid policy, insofar as they aim at an enhanced 
recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities (Section 4). In light of this analysis, 
Section 5 discusses the use of State aid to protect and promote the rights of persons with 
disabilities as a ‘test-bed’ for Europe’s social market economy. Section 6 concludes. 
2. ‘A highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress’ 
  
We will contend, in this article, that encouraging Member States, via the state aid rules, to 
create conditions favourable to the employment of persons with disabilities is a means to 
promote a social market economy. But this begs the question of how the latter term should be 
understood. We begin with the proposition that the social market economy is a problematic 
notion, and unless it is handled with care it is liable to invite confusion. For example, for the 
uninitiated the term may evoke the ‘socialist market economy’, a completely different 
creature found in, among other things, the Chinese constitution.[10] But the social market 
economy should be seen as a concept with rich potential, a concept unburdened by its own 
historical and cultural legacy, and ripe for substantive development. It is likely to mean 
different things to different people based on, for example, whether stress is laid upon the 
word ‘social’ or, by contrast, on the words ‘market economy’. Hermeneutic cleavages may be 
an intrinsic risk of institutionalising these seductive, expansive words. And indeed, the 
various meanings of the ‘social market economy’, even within the German tradition, where 
the popular notion of the concept took on associations independently of and divergent from 
the original intellectual design, have complexified the term, making it ripe for 
misinterpretation. We do not propose a lengthy investigation into the fascinating intellectual, 
historical and cultural legacy of the social market economy. Much of the terrain has already 
been explored retrospectively in various academic treatments.[11] We condense the basics 
into the following summary. 
  
The starting point for the social market economy is the conscious choice in favour of a 
system based on voluntary market transactions, in which competition, price signals and 
private law mechanisms such as contract and tort law are fundamental. This system – with 
constitutional safeguards against the excesses of power in both private and public form – is 
the competitive order famously advocated, with varying points of emphasis, by German 
intellectuals such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Wilhelm Röpke. But markets are 
invariably imperfect and incapable, in and of themselves, of meeting all the requirements of a 
socially just society that attaches value to the fulfilment of basic human needs.[12] The market 
was regarded as a necessary foundation for the (German) post-War society, but it had to be 
supplemented by adequate social policies. This realisation prompted Alfred Müller-Armack, 
a figure well-known from the folklore of European integration and of EU competition law, to 
observe in 1956 that ‘in a system of free competition it is possible for the social duties of 
modern society to be carried out better than in the past’.[13] According to Müller-Armack, 
‘[t]he concept of a social market economy may therefore be defined as a regulative policy 
which aims to combine, on the basis of a competitive economy, free initiative and social 
progress’.[14] However, what is not always obvious is that in advancing the notion that the 
‘market’ and the ‘social’ can work side by side in harmony, where conflicts arose there was 
to be a hierarchy: in principle, measures of social protection were not permitted to violate the 
principle of well-functioning markets. Such measures were thus subject to a test of ‘market 
conformity’. It is this hierarchy that is not easily visible from the term ‘social market 
economy’ taken in isolation and out of context.[15] 
  
The nuances of the social market economy, as originally understood, were made still more 
obscure by the use of the term, in Germany, as a malleable political slogan. The popular 
version of the social market economy combines ‘ideas from liberal thought, social welfarism, 
and corporatism’, and allowed a wide berth for ‘bilateral labor-market cartels’.[16] With the 
concept of the social market economy absorbing such extraneous impurities, and with the 
general erosion of the distinction between that concept and the proverbial ‘welfare state’, 
many of those more in tune with the origins of the social market economy regard its 
implementation in Germany as a history of profound disappointment.[17] 
  
But we now leave history to one side and propose to offer our tentative suggestions as to how 
a European conception of a social market economy, decoupled as far as possible from its 
specific cultural-national tradition, might develop and be interpreted and applied. We do not 
presume to present a complete framework; indeed, such an endeavour would comport poorly 
with our sense that the idea of a social market economy for Europe requires time – for 
reflection, for further concrete action and for dialectic evolution – before its essence and 
boundaries can be fully understood. Here we merely suggest some building blocks that might 
be used for further construction and refinement.             
  
We would start by recalling that the EU still has limited competences with regard to the 
establishment of a socially progressive and socially inclusive supranational polity. Yet it does 
not follow that the EU is powerless to pursue and achieve social aims; furthermore, the Union 
should not be seen artificially as a detached entity but as a key partner in a complex 
collaborative enterprise (not a frictionless one, surely) in which national and supranational 
competences and initiatives interact and can potentially reinforce each other. In addition, for 
all its fits and starts the ECJ has made progress in striking a better balance between free trade 
and national (social) rights,[18] and the Court has at times shown itself willing to give 
precedence to such rights, particularly where the values protected are shared by a large 
number of Member States.[19] Nevertheless, given the EU’s well known limitations in 
relation to taxation and spending powers, the Union simply cannot be expected to be the focal 
point of a grand wealth redistribution system, regardless of whether or not such a system is to 
be desired. Despite the progressive recognition of social rights,[20] and despite achieving at 
least some degree of success with the open method of coordination and with soft governance 
in the field of social policies,[21] the EU still lacks the capacity to deliver a wide range of 
social protection measures according to a criterion of distributive justice, and this constraint 
presents a fundamental challenge to idealistic notions of the social market 
economy.[22] Thus, if Europe is to be a ‘more social Europe’, it will have to be so first 
within the confines of its powers and prerogatives, acting incrementally and depending on 
and expecting Member States to participate within their own spheres of (constrained) action 
and capacity. The notion of a European social market economy must likewise be modulated 
so as to fit the ambitions, capacities and constraints of supranational action. 
  
Bearing in mind the limitations just described and the need for realistic expectations, we 
would further emphasise the need for an ahistorical and forward-looking approach as 
Europe’s social market economy incrementallymaterialises, and as it is 
dialectically conceptualised by observers. In that regard, we would put forward three general 
remarks before we proceed, in the following sections, to consider how the state aid rules have 
been used to support employment of persons with disabilities. 
  
First, the term ‘social market economy’ in the Treaty on European Union introduces, we 
think, more than a rhetorical flourish with which to embellish political speeches. The authors 
of the Treaty have in factconstitutionalised the concept of a social market economy in Article 
3 TEU. The latter Article should be also be considered in conjunction with the horizontal 
clause contained in Article 9 TFEU, which provides that: ‘In defining and implementing its 
policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion 
of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against 
social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human 
health.’[23] These concerns, embedded within the TFEU, may constitute useful indicators of 
what the social component of a ‘social market economy’ might mean. It may also be 
significant that, after Lisbon, for most Member States and absent an ‘opt-out’, fundamental 
social rights are now firmly protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
has been elevated to primary law and given binding force. Conceptually at least, as EU law 
now stands, the ‘market economy’ and the ‘social’ are on what appears to be equal footing; 
and this footing is at the highest rank of law, even if by nature the social market economy is 
not fit to be endowed with direct effect under principles of EU law. Since both aspects of the 
concept have been given constitutional rank, it may be concluded that in situations where a 
conflict between ‘market’ and ‘social’ arises, neither can be permitted to extinguish the other. 
Instead, an effort must be made to apply a kind of practical concordance to these elements in 
order to give them a coherent co-existence. The notion of practical concordance in turn 
implies that the co-interpretation of ‘social’ and ‘market’ should be regarded as a dynamic 
undertaking, or as an ongoing dialogue. 
  
But in other situations, and this is the second point, it should not be assumed that some 
hermetic shield separates the ‘social’ and the ‘market economy’. Scholars have long 
understood that the market is a socially constructed and inherently social institution; and 
while different models emerge to describe and influence the modes in which things of ‘value’ 
are exchanged – from command economy, to mixed economy, to the dreadedlaissez-faire and 
all shades in between – those modes of exchange are fundamentally social, even if 
normatively they may or may not be attractive. A market is an institution in which 
participants express desires and in which those desires are fulfilled totally, partially or not at 
all. Moreover, to the extent that the modes of exchange accord with one’s conception of an 
edifying ‘good life’, they may also be said to have an ethical character. The market economy 
has thus been said to be not just a social institution but an ethical one, even if this perspective 
has obviously also been contested. 
  
Third, not only is the social market economy, as it appears in the TEU, liable to be distinct 
from the concepts associated with the same term in the specific historical frame of the 
German experience, the authors of the Treaty also qualified the term and referred not just to a 
social market economy but to a highly competitive one. What conclusions could be drawn 
from this? It seems clear enough that among at least some of the drafters there must have 
been some lingering anxiety in importing the term ‘social market economy’ into the Treaty, 
and a feeling that it would be prudent to subject that notion to an implicit proviso: the 
adoption of the social market economy as a defining model is not to be construed in a manner 
contrary to the objective of a competitive economy. This already provides another prism 
through which to consider the meaning of Article 3(3) TEU, and it underlines once again that 
the social market economy concept that has been entrusted to the EU need not and should not 
be tied to past custom and usage. The words ‘highly competitive’ seem to reflect a 
recognition that a well-functioning economy producing value in a rivalrous system of 
international economic activity is desirable, and that robust economic performance should be 
preserved notwithstanding the express commitment to a market economy that responds to 
‘social’ needs. It is axiomatic, given the context, development and imperatives of European 
integration, that such economic performance is to be pursued in an economy organised as a 
competitive order – this is made clear, as if it were necessary, by Article 119 TFEU and by 
Protocol 27 on the Internal Market and Competition, not to mention by the more detailed 
internal market and competition rules themselves. On the other hand, it is equally clear from 
the words that immediately follow ‘social market economy’ that the concept is one that aims 
at ‘full employment and social progress’. Taking ‘full employment’ as perhaps a telling sign 
of dissatisfaction with Germany’s own failure to implement a successful version of a social 
market economy, the structure of the overall expression – ‘highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’ – appears to have teleological and 
dynamic content, and appears (to us) as pleading at least implicitly for an autonomous 
character in EU law. Finally, we recall that this highly competitive social market economy is 
portrayed as one of the essential bases for Europe’s sustainable development, the latter 
concept evoking the multiplicity of Europe’s constitutional objectives and, again, the 
dynamic process of construction that is to be guided by those objectives. 
3. State aid control and its role in Europe’s social market economy 
  
According to Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through state 
resources, in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is in principle, in so far 
as the aid affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the internal 
market.[24] The consistent case law of the Court of Justice unequivocally holds that the aim 
of a certain measure, even if it is a social aim, is irrelevant when it comes to classifying it as 
state aid.[25] In other words, the social character of the measure is not sufficient to exclude it 
outright from the scope of Article 107. Hence, the ‘third sector’ does not enjoy any special 
dispensation based on organisational structure or charitable purpose. In 
the Maribel bis/ter case,[26] the ECJ ruled that state aid covers measures which, in various 
forms, mitigate the charges normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, 
although they are not subsidies in the strict sense, are similar in character and have the same 
effect. 
  
State aid is prohibited unless it has been notified to and approved by the Commission, in 
compliance with Article 108 TFEU. A measure must be considered compatible with the 
internal market if it: (i) has a social character and is granted to individual consumers, 
provided that such aid is granted without discrimination as regards the origin of the products; 
or (ii) makes good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences.[27] These categories, which are listed in Article 107(2), are automatically 
exempted from the prohibition of Article 107(1) TFEU; they are sometimes called de 
jure derogations. By contrast, and of greater practical importance, Article 107(3) TFEU 
provides that some other forms of aid may be considered to be compatible with the internal 
market.[28] In this regard, the Commission has significant discretion to carry out an 
assessment of economic, technical and policy considerations, and where appropriate, the 
Commission has room for manoeuvre to take into account the necessity of the aid as a means 
of achieving not only goals of a predominantly economic character, but also relevant social 
objectives. 
  
Article 109 TFEU is the legal base for the adoption of secondary legislation in the field of 
state aid. By complementing the fundamental substantive rules with legislative acts that 
provide for certain exemptions and deminimis thresholds,[29] a rather elaborate system of 
rules has been established. Council Regulation 994/98[30] has given the Commission the 
power to adopt individual regulations in which it declares certain types of aid to be lawful (ie, 
‘compatible’ with the Internal Market), and to exempt them from the obligation of prior 
notification.[31] From 2001 to 2006, the Commission exercised this power by adopting a 
series of regulations,[32] and in 2008 the Commission adopted the General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER),[33] which replaced previous acts and harmonised all horizontal aspects 
applying to specific types of aid.[34] The GBER has also widened the array of 
exemptions, covering several categories of aid in areas which are particularly relevant for the 
Europe 2020 Strategy:[35] regional aid, investment related to small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and employment aid, aid for the creation of enterprises by female 
entrepreneurs, aid for environmental protection, aid for consultancy in support of SMEs and 
SME participation in trade fairs; aid in the form of risk capital; aid for research, development 
and innovation; training aid; and, most importantly for present purposes, aid for the 
employment of disadvantaged or disabled workers (Article 1(1) GBER).[36] Aid not covered 
by the GBER remains subject to the notification requirement. The GBER is thus closely 
linked to many objectives of common interest, and can also be considered as a means to 
promote equal opportunities and social inclusion for certain vulnerable groups, eg, persons 
with disabilities and disadvantaged workers (including people belonging to minorities). The 
GBER thus encourages Member States to focus their resources on aid that will directly 
promote targeted job creation and a more inclusive social environment while seeking to boost 
the EU’s competitiveness. 
  
In addition, in April 2009, a new Simplification Package for State aid with a Best Practice 
Code and a Simplified Procedure Notice was adopted.[37] Both aim at improving the 
effectiveness, transparency and predictability of State aid procedures at each step of an 
investigation, and at encouraging better co-operation between the Commission and the 
Member States. 
  
Beyond the regulatory framework we have roughly described, the distinctiveness of EU state 
aid law and policy is tied to the functions they perform. State aid is certainly one of the most 
politicized EU fields, and it is a field in which the Commission, in the exercise of its 
supervisory powers and wide discretion, may take account of social considerations and find 
ways to reconcile efficiency-oriented goals with other objectives such as solidarity, all within 
the context of its broader mandate, that of pursuing the common European interest. 
  
The main objective of state aid rules, as confirmed by many decisions taken by the European 
Commission and by soft law documents, is to contribute to the maintenance of undistorted 
competition in the EU system. EU law aims to ensure a level playing field for companies 
doing business in Europe, and to prevent Member States from engaging in subsidy races, 
which are unsustainable and detrimental to the EU as a whole, not to mention costly to 
taxpayers. An important policy goal, notwithstanding the spike of aid seen during the 
economic crisis, has been to reduce the general of state aid and to shift the emphasis from 
supporting individual sectors or companies towards horizontal objectives of common interest 
(‘less and better targeted state aid’).[38] At the same time, the Commission has sought, 
through state aid policy, to balance the potential inefficiencies caused by state intervention 
(inefficient allocation of resources, moral hazard, etc.[39]) against the potential gains, 
whether they be related to the correction of market failures or to the promotion of enhanced 
social equity. In pursuit of a coherent balance, the application of the state aid rules has 
become more complex through an evolution which has related, at least indirectly, to 
significant reforms in other areas of competition policy within the framework of Articles 107-
109 TFEU.[40] 
  
It is evident that, in recent years, the Commission has recognised the need of Member States 
to grant much greater volumes of state aid as a means of softening the effects of the financial 
crisis.[41] Based on the principle of ‘less and better targeted State aid’,[42] the central 
objective of the Commission is still to encourage Member States to reduce their overall aid 
levels, while permitting and encouraging grants of aid that address concerns social and 
political objectives that are not always served by market mechanisms. 
4. Aid supporting employment of persons with disabilities 
  
With the adoption of the GBER and related guidelines, the Commission has moved beyond a 
general commitment for ‘social objectives’ by devoting specific attention to persons with 
disabilities. In this section we consider some of the detailed rules governing state aid granted 
for the purpose of promoting the inclusion of such persons in the work force, which in our 
view is a necessary (not to say sufficient) condition of meaningful participation in society. If 
this enhanced level of social participation is to be achieved, it is essential to encourage 
national measures which address unemployment, especially structural unemployment, and 
which ameliorate social exclusion, which is both degrading to individuals and costly to 
society.[43] 
  
We first consider the GBER and, in particular, Articles 41 and 42, which set forth the basic 
rules on aid granted for the employment of disabled workers[44] in the form of wage 
subsidies, and on aid that helps to offset the additional cost of employing disabled 
people.[45] The relevant policy objective in facilitating the grant of aid in this context is to 
boost the demand of employers for this category of workers (Recital 64 GBER). Some 
boldness can be detected here in that, by way of exception to its general scope, the GBER 
allows employment aid (including aid for disabled and disadvantaged workers) even in the 
fisheries and aquaculture sectors, and for the primary production of agricultural products 
(cf Articles 1(3)(a) and 1(3)(b)). 
  
The GBER sets a notification threshold of 10 million euros per undertaking per year for the 
employment of disabled workers and to compensate for any additional expenses of 
employing persons with disabilities (Article 6). The notification threshold has thus been 
doubled compared to the 2002 Regulation.[46] The decision to raise the threshold is a 
subjective and fully ‘political’ choice in the sense that the threshold does not derive from any 
empirical analysis. It does not reflect an amount calibrated to address specific market failures, 
and furthermore the degree of competitive distortion caused by grants of less than 10 
million euros remains unknown and, indeed, undeterminable.[47] In short, the notification 
threshold reflects a subjective ranking of the perceived gravity or importance of the 
corresponding policy objective. 
  
Coming back to the substantive provisions, the first category provided for is aid granted for 
the employment of disabled people in the form of wage subsidies. Pursuant to Article 41(2), 
aid intensity must not exceed 75% of the eligible costs. The Commission has thus decided to 
implement a significant increase of the aid intensity: from the 60% ratio that applied under 
the previous rules to the current figure of 75%. Eligible costs are the wage costs over any 
given period during which the disabled worker is employed. If the period of employment is 
shorter than 12 months, the aid is reduced pro rata (Article 41(5)). The GBER has thus 
removed the minimum requirement of a 12-month contract, which discouraged hiring 
choices. The employment must represent a net increase in the number of jobs or, if that 
number declines, the posts must have fallen vacant following voluntary departure, disability, 
retirement on grounds of age, voluntary reduction of working time or lawful dismissal for 
misconduct, and not as a result of redundancy.[48] Furthermore, employment must be 
maintained for at least the minimum period consistent with national legislation or collective 
agreement. 
  
The second category – aid for compensating the additional costs of employing workers with 
disabilities – is set forth in Article 42. The aid intensity must not exceed 100% of the eligible 
costs (Article 42(2)). Eligible costs are additional costs directly linked to the employment of a 
disabled worker: they include the costs of adapting premises, of employing staff solely to 
assist the disabled worker(s), and of adapting or acquiring equipment for disabled worker(s); 
if the beneficiary provides ‘sheltered’ employment,[49] eligible costs also include the costs of 
constructing, installing or expanding the establishment and any administration and transport 
costs resulting directly from the employment of disabled workers (Article 42(3)). 
  
According to the GBER, accumulation of different categories of aid measures is possible as 
long as the measures concern different identifiable eligible costs. With respect to the same 
eligible costs, accumulation is not allowed for partly or fully overlapping costs if it would 
result in an amount exceeding the highest allowable aid intensity. However, aid in favour of 
disabled workers may be combined with aid exempted under the Regulation in relation to the 
same eligible costs above the highest applicable threshold (ie, 10 million euros). Such 
accumulation must not result in an aid intensity exceeding 100% of the eligible costs over 
any period for which the workers concerned are employed (Article 7(4)). 
  
In addition, the GBER recognises that the promotion of training of disabled workers 
constitutes a central objective of the economic and social policies of the EU and of its 
Member States. The GBER generally covers public support for training, ie support which 
favours one or more firms or sectors of industry by effectively reducing the relative costs 
they would otherwise have to bear if they want their employees to acquire new skills. It 
applies to training aid irrespective of whether the training is provided by companies 
themselves or by public or private training centres. The GBER fixes the notification threshold 
at 2 million euros for training aid projects. Article 38 distinguishes between specific training 
and general training. The first involves tuition directly and principally applicable to the 
employee’s present or future position in the undertaking. The latter concerns tuition for 
training which is not only or principally related to the employee’s present or future position 
in the undertaking but which provides skills largely transferable to other undertakings or 
fields of work. The distinction between specific and general training is unlikely to be clear-
cut in all cases, and some line-drawing may be expected, but the line will have significant 
consequences: where aid is granted for training, its intensity must not exceed 25% of eligible 
costs for specific training and 60% of eligible costs for general training. Eligible costs include 
trainers’ personnel costs; trainers’ and trainees’ travel expenses including accommodation; 
other current expenses (materials, supplies, etc.); depreciation of tools and equipment, to the 
extent that they are used exclusively for the training scheme in question; the cost of guidance 
and counselling services with regard to the training project; and trainees’ personnel costs and 
general indirect costs (administrative costs, rent, overheads) up to the amount of the total of 
the above eligible costs. The aid intensity may be increased, potentially by 10 percentage 
points if the training is given to disabled or disadvantaged workers, subject to a maximum 
combined aid intensity if cumulated with other ‘bonuses’ available for SMEs (10%) and 
small enterprises (20%). 
  
The GBER is remarkable in that it expressly recognises a more ‘flexible’ approach to state 
aid targeted to a particularly vulnerable group that experiences significant, and often severe, 
social exclusion. The GBER itself cannot produce an immediate effect on the employment 
level of persons with disabilities but it facilitates state measures, and in doing so both 
accommodates the Member States and puts an implicit onus on them to take advantage of the 
possibilities available to them. 
  
To what extent are they doing so? The number of block exempted state aid measures for 
employment and training introduced by Member States, during the period 2004-2010, was 
1,005. Of this total, 147 correspond to measures put in place under the block exemption 
regulation on employment,[50] 420 correspond to measures established under the block 
exemption regulation on training,[51] and 438 of the aid measures were granted under the 
GBER.[52] Within the latter category, 66 measures were adopted for the employment of 
disabled workers in the form of wage subsidies (Article 41) and 50 measures granted 
compensation for the additional costs of employing disabled workers (Article 42). We may 
take these numbers as an encouraging sign insofar as they suggest that the opportunity to 
grant exempted aid is not simply languishing in disuse. More recently, in the year 2011, new 
measures were adopted by the Member States, including, for example, aid packages in 
Sicily[53] and Calabria,[54] in Valencia,[55] and in Yorkshire.[56] 
  
Outside the scope of the GBER, individual aid measures involving large aid amounts are not 
prohibited by the Commission; rather, they are subject to the standard obligation of prior 
notification. In 2009, the Commission set out the criteria used to assess the compatibility of 
notified aid measures for disadvantaged and disabled workers (ie, of individual aid targeted to 
combat unemployment of persons with disabilities, granted either ad hoc or as a part of a 
scheme where the grant exceeds 10 million euros).[57] This Communication on the ‘Criteria 
for the compatibility analysis of State aid to disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to 
individual notification’, as noted by others,[58] reflects the ‘refined economic approach’ 
introduced by the Commission’s State Aid Action Plan in 2005. The core instrument of this 
refined economic approach is the ‘balancing test’. The Commission looks at the purpose of 
state aid and, on the other side, Member States must demonstrate that the aid will address the 
equity objective in question. In its analysis, the Commission considers the number and the 
categories of workers concerned by the measure, the employment rates of the categories of 
workers concerned by the measure and the unemployment rates for the categories of workers 
concerned on the national and/or regional level. The Commission evaluates whether the aid 
measure is an appropriate and proportionate policy instrument, and finally balances the 
negative effects, considering whether the aid may result in a change in behaviour of the 
beneficiary.[59] In other words, the Commission employs two related principles: the 
compensatory justification principle and the principle of proportionality. It considers whether 
the aid measure can be justified on the basis that it pursues important aims which correspond 
with the common interest and whether, without the aid, market forces would be unable to 
achieve such aims. In addition, the Commission examines whether the measure is necessary 
and is the least distortive method of pursuing the relevant objective of common interest. 
  
The Commission has ample room for manoeuvre, and the ‘criteria set out in this guidance 
will not be applied mechanically’.[60] The evaluation of the extent to which the positive 
effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects is done on a case-by-case basis. 
  
The experience with the Communication is still limited, and with limited data it is too early to 
assess the impact of this instrument. Nevertheless, the adoption of the Communication is 
another positive step in this policy area insofar as it contributes to predictability with regard 
to the Commission’s methodology. Enhanced predictability should lead, in principle 
and ceteris paribus, to greater levels of investment. 
5. A test-bed for Europe’s social market economy 
  
The rules contained in the GBER and the guidelines contained in the 2009 Communication 
described above expressly recognise that people with disabilities are a particularly vulnerable 
group, and that they still experience social exclusion and acute difficulties in seeking to enter 
the labour market. These represent a renewed commitment by the Commission to the 
promotion of equality and full employment through EU state aid policy. The enhanced 
threshold of 10 million euros per undertaking per year for the employment of disabled 
workers (see previous section) is a positive sign indicating that the welfare of persons with 
disability is becoming a matter of greater priority. 
  
In portraying the rules on state aid in support of employment of persons with disabilities as a 
‘test-bed’ for a new concept of a social market economy, we should be careful not to be 
swept away, or overstate the point. We acknowledge, for example, that the provisions of the 
GBER contribute to the fulfilment of the international obligations assumed by the 
EU[61] under the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (the ‘UN CRPD’, 
or the ‘Convention’),[62] and this development is worth highlighting for a moment 
here. Indeed, the signature and conclusion of the UN CRPD has had important legal effects, 
as the Convention commits the EU to higher standards of non-discrimination, accessibility 
and inclusion, and sets forth, as a general principle, ‘equality of opportunity’. The GBER can 
also be considered as an instrument that promotes equal opportunities and the removal of 
barriers that impede full participation in society, as envisaged in the UN CRPD. In particular, 
Articles 41 and 42 of the GBER seem to contribute to the fulfilment of the international 
obligations laid down in Articles 4 and 27 UN CRPD.[63] They may also be regarded as a 
means of complying with Article 19 UN CRPD, which imposes a general obligation on the 
Parties to recognise the ‘equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, 
with choices equal to others’, and to ‘take effective and appropriate measures to facilitate full 
enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and participation 
in the community’.[64] The 2009 Communication, which explains how the Commission 
assesses aid for disabled workers where the aid must be notified, can also be regarded as a 
means of compliance, notwithstanding its soft law character. 
  
Furthermore, developments in the field of state aid are linked to the evolution of the EU’s 
general disability policy.[65] Disability issues are of growing importance in the EU’s sphere 
of activities, and this trend has been reinforced by the adoption, last November 2010, of the 
new EU disability Strategy for 2010-2020.[66] The GBER is thus not an isolated instrument 
but rather supplements broader efforts by the EU to mainstream disability rights issues across 
the entire range of EU policies. Such efforts – which are also called for in the UN CRPD – 
were previously reflected in the EU Disability Action Plan 2003-2010, and today they 
are highlighted in the Strategy adopted in 2010. 
  
But the foregoing points do not diminish the contribution of the GBER and the 2009 
Communication, particularly given the rather more specific and operative character of these 
instruments. The contribution of those instruments to enhanced inclusiveness provides a 
useful lens through which to consider Europe’s social market economy. On the one hand, like 
the EU’s broader policy efforts, the GBER and the Communication recognise, explicitly and 
implicitly, that persons with disabilities face social exclusion and impoverished access to 
goods, services, rights and political voice. But they also link this concern (one of a 
fundamentally social nature) to the more historically familiar dimensions of growth, jobs and 
improved welfare that have driven European economic integration ever since the days of 
Monnet, Beyen and Spaak. 
6. Concluding remarks 
  
The original European Economic Community, closely associated with some of the venerable 
names mentioned above, was primarily concerned with trade liberalisation (ie, the removal of 
obstacles to flows of goods, persons, services and capital), efficient resource allocation and 
global competition, particularly given the onslaught of large American companies. In 1972, 
that is to say, once the EEC’s customs union was up and running, the Heads of State and 
Government of the Community countries, meeting in Paris, affirmed the ‘social dimension’ 
of the construction of Europe. Two years later, this was given a more tangible form in the 
Community’s firstSocial Action Programme. This brought together social policy objectives 
across a wide range of areas, and provided for specific actions to be taken at Community and 
national levels to secure improved living and working conditions across the Community. 
Following on from this Action Programme, and from later programmes specifically aimed at 
developing strategies in the equality and health and safety fields, a body of EEC-level social 
legislation gradually developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Treaty amendments 
significantly expanded the Community’s competence in the social sphere to include, initially, 
a broader range of employment matters. 
  
The evolution continues. Under the Lisbon Treaty, while the EU’s competences in the social 
field are still limited, and while European social legislation reflects these limits, a new 
comprehensive social agenda has been launched. But more significantly, social aims have 
also been reflected to some extent, as we have seen, within the field of competition policy, 
broadly understood.[67] Our suggestion is that the rules on state aid supporting the 
employment of persons with disabilities may reflect a somewhat more robust version of 
social Europe, and a new way to reconcile the principle of an open market economy with 
certain forms of solidarity. 
  
The fact that the social market economy concept now appears in the TEU as a basis for 
Europe’s sustainable development is no guarantee that the concept will play a significant role 
in defining Europe’s identity or shaping the interpretation and application of European law. 
Nevertheless, the social market economy has significant potential as an interpretive guideline 
for the EU as it carries out its activities within the limits of its competences. 
  
In this paper we have pointed to the congruence between the ideal of a social market 
economy, in which social protection and social inclusion are assigned roles of equal dignity 
with market values, on the one hand, and the use of the EU’s powers in the field of state aid 
as a means to support the employment of persons with disabilities, on the other. In this 
respect, the aims of full employment and social progress are advanced – in a collaborative 
effort between the EU and its Member States – through measures addressing market failure 
and social exclusion. These may be seen as small but significant steps in a ‘formative’ period 
whereby a more social Europe asserts itself and whereby the EU gains, perhaps, greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.      
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has a recognised limitation resulting from physical, mental or psychological 
impairment (Article 2(20)). The definition of disabled workers does not coveraged workers. 
In Decision No. 210/2009 ([2009] OJ C162/7), where the Commission examined a Spanish 
scheme for the reduction of social security contributions for aged workers in the furniture 
sector (‘Article 41 of the GBER is also not applicable to the present scheme, because the 
aged workers targeted by the measure do not qualify as “disabled workers” in the sense of the 
definition provided by Article 2.20 of the GBER.’ – para 15 of the public version). The 
conditions to be satisfied in the case of aid for employment of disabled workers in the form of 
wage subsidies are set out in the Regulation; they substantially modified the conditions 
provided for in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2204/2002 of 12 December 2002 on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid for employment [2002] OJ 
L337/3. 
[45] Section 9 GBER is dedicated to disadvantaged and disabled workers. Article 40 sets 
forth rules on aid granted for the employment of disadvantaged workers in the form of wage 
subsidies. A ‘disadvantaged worker’ is anyone who: has not been regularly employed in past 
six months; does not have an upper secondary educational or vocational qualification; is over 
the age of 50; lives as a single adult with one or more dependents; works in a 
sector/profession that has a strong gender imbalance, and belongs to the underrepresented 
group; or is a member of an ethnic minority and needs to develop their linguistic 
knowledge/vocational training/ professional experience. A ‘severely disadvantaged worker’ 
is anyone who has been unemployed for at least 24 months. See Domenico Garofalo, ‘La 
nozione di svantaggio occupazionale’ [2009] Diritti lavori mercati 569. 
[46] For the purpose of calculating aid intensity, the aid and the costs are expressed before 
taxes. Notification thresholds and ceilings apply to aid from all sources (Article 7(1)). 
[47] See Christian Buelens, Gaëlle Garnier and Roderick Meiklejohn (2007) ‘The Economic 
Analysis of State Aid: Some Open Questions’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication9549_en.pdf> accessed 15 
September 2011. 
[48] See Article 41(4) GBER. 
[49] Sheltered employment programs assist individuals who are regarded as unable to work 
in a competitive employment setting. The work activity may be carried out, for example, in 
special work areas or at home. Such programs have not been free of controversy, since there 
is at least some risk that they may perpetuate the social divisions they are designed to 
overcome. 
[50] Commission Regulation No 2204/2002 of 12 December 2002 on the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid for employment [2002] OJ L337/3 (in force 
prior to the introduction of the GBER). 
[51] Commission Regulation No 68/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 
87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid [2001] OJ L10/20 (in force prior to the 
introduction of the GBER). 
[52] See COM(2011) 356 final. 
[53] Aiuti all’occupazione per l’assunzione a tempo indeterminato di lavoratori 
svantaggiati, molto svantaggiati e disabili. ex Titolo VI L.r. 9/2009 e CAPO II L.r. 
11/2010 ex Reg. UE 800/2008, 2011/X [2011] OJ C/118. 
[54] X13/2010 [2010] OJ C/15. 
[55] See SA.32893 Fomento del empleo protegido para personas con discapacidad en 
centros especiales de empleo y enclaves laborales para 2011, 2011/X [2011] OJ C/171. 
[56] See SA.33140 Changeworks - wage subsidy scheme, 2011/X [2011] OJ C/224. 
[57] [2009] OJ C188/6 (Communication). 
[58] See Justyna Majcher-Williams and Juergen Foecking, ‘State aid for disabled and 
disadvantaged workers: compatibility criteria for big cases’ [2010/1] Competition Policy 
Newsletter 20-22. 
[59] The aid characteristics which may affect the likelihood and the size of the distortion are: 
selectivity and asymmetry; size of aid; repetition and duration of aid; and the effect of the aid 
on a firm’s costs. The Commission in its assessment considers the structure of the market, 
and the characteristics of the sector and of the national labour market. 
[60] Point 4 of the Communication. 
[61] The European Community, as it was then called, having signed the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, acceded to the Convention with Council Decision 
2010/48/EC, formally adopted on 26 November 2009 under the EC Treaty. The ratification 
process was formally concluded in December 2010, when the EU deposited the instrument of 
formal confirmation, in accordance with Articles 41 and 43 of the UN Convention. On the 
ratification of the UN CRPD by the EC/EU, see DeliaFerri, ‘The Conclusion of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by the EC/EU: A Constitutional 
Perspective’, in Lisa Waddington and Gerard Quinn (eds), European Yearbook of Disability 
Law, vol 2 (Intersentia 2010) 47. 
[62] The UN CRPD (together with its Optional Protocol) was adopted by consensus by the 
UN General Assembly on 13 December 2006. It was opened for signature on 30 March 2007 
and entered into force on 3 May 2008, as did its Optional Protocol.See, among others, Sergio 
Marchisio, Rachele Cera and Valentina Della Fina, La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui 
diritti delle persone con disabilità. Commentario (Aracne 2010). 
[63] Article 4 UN CRPD refers broadly to a variety of measures intended to combat 
discrimination against and to promote the rights of persons with disabilities. Article 27(1) UN 
CRPD provides, inter alia, that ‘States Parties shall safeguard and promote the realization of 
the right to work, including for those who acquire a disability during the course of 
employment, by taking appropriate steps, including through legislation, to […] (h) 
[p]romote the employment of persons with disabilities in the private sector through 
appropriate policies and measures, which may include affirmative action programmes, 
incentives and other measures.’ 
[64] However, there seem to be two significant weaknesses in the GBER. First of all, the 
definition of ‘disabled workers’ (Article 2(20)) appears to refer to the out-of-date medical 
model: emphasis is placed on the limitation which results from the impairment. Secondly, the 
GBER does not mention aid for research in the field of accessibility and universal design. 
[65] In the last decade, the EC/EU has developed a significant disability policy. The EC’s 
activities regarding disability were relaunched in 1996, with the European Community 
Disability Strategy. This was a typical soft law instrument. From a strictly legal point of 
view, the EC competence to take action to address disability discrimination was found 
primarily in Article 13 EC, which was added in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ie, after 
the Strategy of 1996). The Charter of Fundamental Rights represented a new step towards 
more comprehensive action. Article 21 of the Charter lists disability as one of the grounds on 
which discrimination must be prohibited. Article 21 is supplemented by Article 26, according 
to which ‘the Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit 
from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and 
participation in the life of the community’. At present, the principal EC/EU 
antidiscrimination legislation in the field of disability is Directive 2000/78 establishing a 
General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, which is based on 
Article 13 EC ([2000] OJ L303/16). This is not a disability-specific legal instrument. The 
Directive aims at facilitating the integration of persons with disabilities, not simply by the 
prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination against them but also by imposing a duty 
of reasonable accommodation. Other pieces of EC/EU legislation also address disability, 
albeit indirectly. In addition to the inclusion of provisions in general directives such as these, 
the Council of Ministers has adopted a variety of non-binding instruments addressing the 
need to mainstream disability issues in particular fields. These non-binding instruments, 
which take the form of Resolutions and Communications, call on the Member States, the 
Commission and occasionally the Social Partners and civil society to take action to improve 
the lives of persons with disabilities in various ways. Such initiatives have addressed fields as 
diverse as employment and social integration, culture and education (non-extensively), the 
knowledge-based society and a barrier-free society. The EU Disability Action Plan2003-
2010 (COM(2003) 650) carried forward the 1996 Strategy and continued in the direction 
already traced by the preceding initiatives. On 15 November 2010, a new Disability Strategy 
was adopted (see COM(2010) 636 final). The Disability Strategy 2010-2020 outlines how the 
EU and national governments can empower people with disabilities so they can better enjoy 
their rights. 
[66] COM(2010) 636 final. This new EU Strategy identifies actions at EU level to 
supplement national ones, and it determines the mechanisms needed to implement the UN 
Convention at EU level, including inside the EU institutions. It also identifies the support 
needed for funding, research, awareness-raising, statistics and data collection. The Strategy 
focuses on eliminating barriers across eight main areas: accessibility, participation, equality, 
employment, education and training, social protection, health, and external action. For each 
area, key actions are identified and a timeline is provided. These areas were selected on the 
basis of the overall objectives of the EU Disability strategy, the UN CRPD (discussed above), 
related policy documents of the EU institutions and of the Council of Europe, the results of 
the EU Disability Action Plan 2003-2010, and a consultation of the Member States, 
stakeholders and the general public. 
[67] For purposes of this article we have obviously left aside other matters of competition 
law, including, for example, an intriguing and long-running debate with regard to the breadth 
of Article 101(3) TFEU and of the expression ‘technical or economic progress’. We merely 
note that attempts to determine the scope of Article 101(3) must take account of a number of 
significant institutional factors and of the evolved structure of European antitrust enforcement 
in modern times.     
  
 
